|
CTRL-D to Bookmark
| |
Breaking the Taboo on Israel's Spying Efforts on the
United States
By
Christopher Ketcham, AlterNet.
Posted
March 10, 2009.
Israel runs one of the most aggressive and damaging
espionage networks targeting the U.S., yet public discussion about it is
almost nil.
Scratch a counterintelligence officer in the U.S.
government and they'll tell you that Israel is not a friend to the United
States.
This is because Israel runs one of the most aggressive
and damaging espionage networks targeting the U.S.. The fact of Israeli
penetration into the country is not a subject oft-discussed in the media or in
the circles of governance, due to the extreme sensitivity of the U.S.-Israel
relationship coupled with the burden of the Israel lobby, which punishes
legislators who dare to criticize the Jewish state. The void where the
facts should sit is filled instead with the hallucinations of conspiracy theory
-- the kind in which, for example, agents of the Mossad, Israel’s top
intelligence agency, engineer the 9/11 attacks, while 4,000 Israelis in the Twin
Towers somehow all get word to escape before the planes hit. The effect,
as disturbing as it is ironic, is that the less the truth is addressed, the more
noxious the falsity that spreads.
Israel's spying on the U.S., however, is a matter of
public record, and neither conspiracy nor theory is needed to present the
evidence. When the FBI produces its annual report to Congress
concerning "Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage," Israel and
its intelligence services often feature prominently as a threat second only to
China. In 2005 the FBI noted, for example, that Israel maintains "an active
program to gather proprietary information within the United States." A key
Israeli method, said the FBI report, is computer intrusion. In 1996, the
Defense Intelligence Service, a branch of the Pentagon, issued a warning that
"the collection of scientific intelligence in the United States [is] the third
highest priority of Israeli Intelligence after information on its Arab neighbors
and information on secret U.S. policies or decisions relating to Israel."
In 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a scathing survey of Israeli
intelligence activities that targeted the U.S. government. Like any worthy
spy service, Israeli intelligence early on employed wiretaps as an effective
tool, according to the CIA report. In 1954, the U.S. Ambassador in Tel
Aviv discovered in his office a hidden microphone "planted by the Israelis," and
two years later telephone taps were found in the residence of the U.S. military
attaché. In a telegram to Washington, the ambassador at the time cabled a
warning: "Department must assume that all conversations [in] my office are known
to the Israelis." The former ambassador to Qatar, Andrew Killgore, who also
served as a foreign officer in Jerusalem and Beirut, told me Israeli taps of
U.S. missions and embassies in the Middle East were part of a "standard
operating procedure."
According to the 1979 CIA report, the Israelis, while
targeting political secrets, also devote "a considerable portion of their covert
operations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence." These operations
involved, among other machinations, "attempts to penetrate certain classified
defense projects in the United States." The penetrations, according
to the CIA report, were effected using "deep cover enterprises," which the
report described as "firms and organizations, some specifically created for, or
adaptable to, a specific objective." At the time, the CIA singled out
government-subsidized companies such as El Al airlines and Zim, the Israeli
shipping firm, as deep cover enterprises. Other deep cover operations
included the penetration of a U.S. company that provided weapons-grade uranium
to the Department of Defense during the 1960s; Israeli agents eventually
spirited home an estimated 200 pounds of uranium as the bulwark in Israel’s
secret nuclear weapons program. Moles have burrowed on Israel’s behalf
throughout the U.S. intelligence services. Perhaps most infamous was the
case of Jonathan Pollard, a Jewish-American employed as a civilian analyst with
the U.S. Navy who purloined an estimated 800,000 code-word protected documents
from inside the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and numerous other U.S.
agencies. While Pollard was sentenced to life in prison,
counterintelligence investigators at the FBI suspected he was linked to a mole
far higher in the food chain, ensconced somewhere in the DIA, but this suspected
Israeli operative, nicknamed "Mr. X," was never found. Following the
embarrassment of the Pollard affair -- and its devastating effects on U.S.
national security, as testified by then Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger (who
allegedly stated that Pollard "should have been shot") -- the Israeli government
vowed never again to pursue espionage against its ally and chief benefactor.
Fast-forward a quarter century, and the vow has proven
empty. In 2004, the authoritative Jane's Intelligence Group noted that
Israel's intelligence organizations "have been spying on the U.S. and running
clandestine operations since Israel was established." The former deputy
director of counterintelligence at FBI, Harry B. Brandon, last year told
Congressional Quarterly magazine that "the Israelis are interested in commercial
as much as military secrets. They have a muscular technology sector themselves."
According to CQ, "One effective espionage tool is forming joint partnerships
with U.S. companies to supply software and other technology products to U.S.
government agencies."
Best-selling author James Bamford now adds
another twist in this history of infiltration in a book published last October,
"The Shadow Factory," which forms the latest installment in his trilogy of
investigations into the super-secret National Security Agency. Bamford is
regarded among journalists and intelligence officers as the nation’s expert on
the workings of the NSA, whose inner sanctums he first exposed to the public in
1982. (So precise is his reporting that NSA officers once threw him a book
party, despite the fact that he continually reveals their secrets.) The
agency has come a long way in the half-century since its founding in 1952.
Armed with digital technology and handed vast new funding and an almost
limitless mandate in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Bamford writes, the NSA has
today "become the largest, most costly, and most technologically sophisticated
spy organization the world has ever known." The NSA touches on every facet
of U.S. communications, its mega-computers secretly filtering "millions of phone
calls and e-mails" every hour of operation. For those who have followed
the revelations of the NSA’s "warrantless wiretapping" program in the
New
York Times in 2005 and the
Wall Street Journal
last year, what Bamford unveils
in "The Shadow Factory" is only confirmation of the worst fears: "There is now
the capacity," he writes of the NSA’s tentacular reach into the private lives of
Americans, "to make tyranny total."
Much less has been reported about the high-tech
Israeli wiretapping firms that service U.S. telecommunications companies,
primarily AT&T and Verizon, whose networks serve as the chief conduits for NSA
surveillance. Even less is known about the links between those Israeli
companies and the Israeli intelligence services. But what Bamford suggests
in his book accords with the history of Israeli spying in the U.S.: Through
joint partnerships with U.S. telecoms, Israel may be a shadow arm of
surveillance among the tentacles of the NSA. In other words, when the NSA
violates constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure to
vacuum up the contents of your telephone conversations and e-mail traffic, the
Israeli intelligence services may be gathering it up too -- a kind of mirror tap
that is effectively a two-government-in-one violation.
***
On its face, the overseas outsourcing of high-tech
services would seem de rigueur in a competitive globalized marketplace.
Equipment and services from Israel’s telecom sector are among the country’s
prime exports, courtesy of Israeli entrepreneurs who have helped pioneer
wireless telephony, voicemail and voice recognition software, instant messaging,
phone billing software, and, not least, "communications interception solutions."
Israeli telecom interception hardware and software is appraised as some of the
best in the world.
By the mid-1990s, Israeli wiretap firms would arrive
in the U.S. in a big way. The key to the kingdom was the 1994
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which was Congress’
solution for wiretapping in the digital age. Gone are the days when
wiretaps were conducted through on-site tinkering with copper switches.
CALEA mandated that telephonic surveillance operate through computers linked
directly into the routers and hubs of telecom companies -- a spyware apparatus
matched in real-time, all the time, to American telephones and modems.
CALEA effectively made spy equipment an inextricable ligature in telephonic
life. Without CALEA, the NSA in its spectacular surveillance exploits
could not have succeeded.
AT&T and Verizon, which together manage as much as 90
percent of the nation’s communications traffic, contracted with Israeli firms in
order to comply with CALEA. AT&T employed the services of Narus Inc.,
which was founded in Israel in 1997. It was Narus technology that AT&T
whistleblower Mark Klein, a 22-year technician with the company, famously
unveiled in a 2006 affidavit that described the operations in AT&T’s secret
tapping room at its San Francisco facilities. (Klein’s affidavit formed
the gravamen of a lawsuit against AT&T mounted by the Electronic Freedom
Foundation, but the lawsuit died when Congress passed the telecom immunity bill
last year.) According to Klein, the Narus supercomputer, the STA 6400, was
"known to be used particularly by government intelligence agencies because of
its ability to sift through large amounts of data looking for preprogrammed
targets." The Narus system, which was maintained by Narus technicans, also
provided a real-time mirror image of all data streaming through AT&T routers, an
image to be rerouted into the computers of the NSA.
According to Jim Bamford, who cites knowledgeable
sources, Verizon’s eavesdropping program is run by a competing Israeli firm
called Verint, a subsidiary of Comverse Technology, which was founded by a
former Israeli intelligence officer in 1984. Incorporated in New York and
Tel Aviv, Comverse is effectively an arm of the Israeli government: 50 percent
of its R&D costs are reimbursed by the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade.
The Verint technology deployed throughout Verizon’s network, known as STAR-GATE,
boasts an array of Orwellian capabilities. "With STAR-GATE, service
providers can access communications on virtually any type of network," according
to the company’s literature. "Designed to manage vast numbers of targets,
concurrent sessions, call data records, and communications, STAR-GATE
transparently accesses targeted communications without alerting subscribers or
disrupting service." As with the Narus system, the point is to be able to
tap into communications unobtrusively, in real time, all the time. A
Verint spinoff firm, PerSay, takes the tap to the next stage, deploying
"advanced voice mining," which singles out "a target’s voice within a large
volume of intercepted calls, regardless of the conversation content or method of
communication." Verint’s interception systems have gone global since
the late 1990s, and sales in 2006 reached $374 million (a doubling of its
revenues over 2003). More than 5,000 organizations -- mostly intelligence
services and police units -- in at least 100 countries today use Verint
technology.
What troubles Bamford is that executives and directors
at companies like Narus and Verint formerly worked at or maintain close
connections with the Israeli intelligence services, including Mossad; the
internal security agency Shin Bet; and the Israeli version of the NSA, Unit
8200, an arm of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Corps. Unit 8200,
which Bamford describes as "hypersecret," is a key player in the eavesdropping
industrial complex in Israel, its retired personnel dispersed throughout dozens
of companies. According to Ha’aretz, the Israeli daily, "Many of the
[eavesdropping] technologies in use around the world and developed in Israel
were originally military technologies and were developed and improved by [Unit
8200] veterans." A former commander of Unit 8200, cited by Bamford, states
that Verint technology was "directly influenced by 8200 technology….[Verint
parent company] Comverse’s main product, the Logger, is based on the Unit’s
technology." The implications for U.S. national security, writes
Bamford, are "unnerving." "Virtually the entire American
telecommunications system," he avers, "is bugged by [Israeli-formed] companies
with possible ties to Israel’s eavesdropping agency." Congress, he says,
maintains no oversight of these companies’ operations, and even their contracts
with U.S. telecoms -- contracts pivotal to NSA surveillance -- are considered
trade secrets and go undisclosed in company statements.
U.S. intelligence officers have not been quiet in
their concerns about Verint (I reported on this matter in
CounterPunch.org last September). "Phone calls are
intercepted, recorded, and transmitted to U.S. investigators by Verint, which
claims that it has to be ‘hands on’ with its equipment to maintain the system,"
says former CIA counterterrorism officer Philip Giraldi. The "hands on"
factor is what bothers Giraldi, specifically because of the possibility of a
"trojan" embedded in Verint wiretap software. A trojan in
information security hardware/software is a backdoor that can be accessed
remotely by parties who normally would not have access to the secure system.
Allegations of widespread trojan spying have rocked the Israeli business
community in recent years. "Top Israeli blue chip companies," reported the
AP in 2005, "are suspected of using illicit surveillance software to steal
information from their rivals and enemies." Over 40 companies have come
under scrutiny. "It is the largest cybercrime case in Israeli history,"
Boaz Guttmann, a veteran cybercrimes investigator with the Israeli national
police, told me. "Trojan horse espionage is part of the way of life of
companies in Israel. It’s a culture of spying."
In a wide-ranging four-part investigation into
Israel-linked espionage that aired in December 2001, Carl Cameron, a
correspondent at Fox News Channel, reported the distress among U.S. intelligence
officials warning about possible trojans cached in Verint technology.
Sources told Cameron that "while various FBI inquiries into [Verint] have been
conducted over the years," the inquiries had "been halted before the actual
equipment has ever been thoroughly tested for leaks." Cameron also
cited a 1999 internal FCC document indicating that "several government agencies
expressed deep concerns that too many unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel
can access the wiretap system." Much of this access was facilitated
through "remote maintenance."
The Fox News report reverberated throughout U.S. law
enforcement, particularly at the Drug Enforcement Agency, which makes extensive
use of wiretaps for narcotics interdiction. Security officers at DEA, an adjunct
of the Justice Department, began examining the agency’s own relationship with
Comverse/Verint. In 1997, DEA had transformed its wiretap infrastructure
with the $25 million procurement from Comverse/Verint of a technology called
"T2S2" -- "translation and transcription support services" -- with
Comverse/Verint contracted to provide the hardware and software. The
company was also tasked with "support services, training, upgrades, enhancements
and options throughout the life of the contract," according to the DEA’s
"contracts and acquisitions" notice. In the wake of the Fox News
investigation, however, the director of security programs at DEA, Heidi
Raffanello, was rattled enough to issue an internal communiqué on the matter,
dated Dec. 18, 2001. Directly referencing Fox News, she worried that
"Comverse remote maintenance" was "not addressed in the C&A [contracts and
acquisitions] process….It remains unclear if Comverse personnel are security
cleared, and if so, who are they and what type of clearances are on
record….Bottom line we should have caught it." It is not known what
resulted from DEA’s review of the issue of remote maintenance and access by
Comverse/Verint.
Bamford devotes a portion of his argument to the
detailing of the operations of a third Israeli wiretap company, NICE Systems,
which he describes as "a major eavesdropper in the U.S." that "keeps its
government and commercial client list very secret." Formed in 1986 by
seven veterans of Unit 8200, NICE software "captures voice, email, chat, screen
activity, and essential call details," while offering "audio compression
technology that performs continuous recordings of up to thousands of analog and
digital telephone lines and radio channels." NICE Systems has on at least
one occasion shown up on the radar of U.S. counterintelligence. During
2000-2001, when agents at the FBI and the CIA began investigating
allegations that Israeli nationals posing as "art students" were in fact
conducting espionage on U.S. soil, one of the Israeli "art students" was
discovered to be an employee with NICE Systems. Among the targets of the
art students were facilities and offices of the Drug Enforcement Agency
nationwide. The same Israeli employee of NICE Systems, who was identified as a
former operative in the Israeli intelligence services, was carrying a disk that
contained a file labeled "DEA Groups." U.S. counterintelligence officers
concluded it was a highly suspicious nexus: An Israeli national and alleged spy
was working for an Israeli wiretap company while carrying in his possession
computer information regarding the Drug Enforcement Agency -- at the same time
this Israeli was conducting what the DEA described as "intelligence gathering"
about DEA facilities.
***
A former senior counterintelligence official in the
Bush administration told me that as early as 1999, "CIA was very concerned about
[Israeli wiretapping companies]" -- Verint in particular. "I know that CIA
has tried to monitor what the Israelis were doing -- technically watch what they
were doing on the networks in terms of remote access. Other countries were
concerned as well," said the intelligence official. Jim Bamford, who notes
that Verint "can automatically access the mega-terabytes of stored and real-time
data secretly and remotely from anywhere," reports that Australian lawmakers in
2004 held hearings on this remote monitoring capability. "[Y]ou can access data
from overseas," the lawmakers told a Verint representative during the hearings,
"but [the legislature] seems restricted to access data within that system."
The Australians found this astonishing. In 2000, the Canadian intelligence
service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, conducted "a probe related to
allegations that [Israeli] spies used rigged software to hack into Canada's top
secret intelligence files," according to an article in the Toronto Star.
Several sources in the U.S. intelligence community told me the Canadians liaised
with their American counterparts to try to understand the problem.
According to the Bush administration official who spoke with me, "the Dutch also
had come to the CIA very concerned about what the Israelis were doing with
this." The Dutch intelligence service, under contract with Verint, "had
discovered strange things were going on -- there was activity on the network,
the Israelis uploading and downloading stuff out of the switches, remotely, and
apparently using it for their own wiretap purposes. The CIA was very
embarrassed to say, ‘We have the same problem.’ But the CIA didn’t have an
answer for them. ‘We hear you, we’re surprised, and we understand your
concern.’" Indeed, sources in the Dutch counterintelligence community in
2002 claimed there was "strong evidence that the Israeli secret service has
uncontrolled access to confidential tapping data collected by the Dutch police
and intelligence services," according to the Dutch broadcast radio station
Evangelische Omroep (EO). In January 2003, the respected Dutch technology and
computing magazine, C’T, ran a follow-up to the EO story, headlined "Dutch
Tapping Room not Kosher." The article states: "All tapping equipment of the
Dutch intelligence services and half the tapping equipment of the national
police force [is] insecure and is leaking information to Israel."
"The key to this whole thing is that Australian
meeting," Bamford told me in a recent interview. "They accused Verint of remote
access and Verint said they won’t do it again -- which implies they were doing
it in the past. It’s a matter of a backdoor into the system, and those
backdoors should not be allowed to exist. You can tell by the Australian
example that it was certainly a concern of Australian lawmakers."
Congress doesn’t seem to share the concern.
"Part of the responsibility of Congress," says Bamford, "is not just to oversee
the intelligence community but to look into the companies with which the
intelligence community contracts. They’re just very sloppy about this."
According to the Bush administration intelligence official who spoke with me,
"Frustratingly, I did not get the sense that our government was stepping up to
this and grasping the bull by the horns." Another former high level U.S.
intelligence official told me, "The fact of the vulnerability of our telecom
backbone is indisputable. How it came to pass, why nothing has been done,
who has done what -- these are the incendiary questions." There is also
the fundamental fact that the wiretap technologies implemented by Verint, Narus
and other Israeli companies are fully in place and no alternative is on the
horizon. "There is a technical path dependence problem," says the Bush
administration official. "I have been told nobody else makes software like this
for the big digital switches, so that is part of the problem. Other
issues," he adds, "compound the problem" -- referring to the sensitivity of the
U.S.-Israel relationship.
And that, of course, is the elephant in the room.
"Whether it’s a Democratic or Republican administration, you don’t bad-mouth
Israel if you want to get ahead," says former CIA counterterrorism officer
Philip Giraldi. "Most of the people in the agency were very concerned
about Israeli espionage and Israeli actions against U.S. interests. Everybody
was aware of it. Everybody hated it. But they wouldn’t get promoted
if they spoke out. Israel has a privileged position and that’s the way
things are. It’s crazy. And everybody knows it’s crazy."

|